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ABSTRACT 
This report summarizes the salient features of spacecraft mechanical 
operations based on experience with the Mariner IV spacecraft. The 
scope of these operations is presented through photographs of various 
flight and test configurations. Particular operational aspects, iiicluding 
assembly problems, flight preparation, personnel, and documentation, 
are discussed. General conclusions are drawn regarding spacecraft 
mechanical operations that may be of value to future space projects. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Mariner Mars 1964 mission was a flyby of the 
planet Mars by  a spacecraft launched during the 1964 
opportunity. The primary objective of the mission was 
to conduct scientific observations of the planet and to 
transmit the results of these observations to Earth. A 
secondary objective was to provide experience and 
knowledge about the performance of the basic engineer- 
ing equipment of an attitude-stabilized flyby spacecraft 
during a long duration space flight farther away from 
the Sun than the Earth. An additional secondary objec- 
tive was to conduct certain field and/or particle mea- 
surements in interplanetary space and in the vicinity 
of Mars. These measurements included televising the 
planet’s surface and obtaining atmospheric data based on 
occultation of the spacecraft’s radio signals by the planet. 
The new spacecraft design was designated Mariner C 
class, based on Ranger/Mariner technology. It used in- 
novational developments only where absolutely neces- 
sary, or where equipment lifetime was not a primary 
concern. Mariner ZZZ and Mariner IV are spacecraft of 
this class. Mariner ZZZ was launched on November 5, 1964, 
but was unable to function as designed because of a 
structural failure of the launch vehicle’s aerodynamic 
shroud which enclosed the spacecraft. Because of the 
failure, the shroud could not be jettisoned and the space- 
craft died approximately nine hours after launch when its 
battery was depleted. A new protective shroud was de- 
signed and fabricated for Mariner ZV, which was 
launched on November 28, 1964. All systems functioned 
as designed and Mariner ZV proceeded to complete all 
mission objectives. It continued to function nominally 
until the mission was temporarily terminated on October 
1, 1965. At that time, the spacecraft was commanded to 
transmit over the low-gain antenna so that telemetry 
could be received by Earth at a later date. Since then, 
the spacecraft has again come within range of telemetry 
reception by Earth. 
1 
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This report outlines the scope of mechanical opera- suggested by a list of the major spacecraft tests with 
tions performed on Mariner Mars 1964 flight spacecraft accompanying photographs of how the tests were me- 
and discusses those aspects of spacecraft mechanical chanically implemented. The responsibilities of the 
operations that may be generally applicable to other mechanical test team will be discussed, and some gen- 
projects. Rather than present a detailed description of eral conclusions drawn regarding both the staffing of 
how the mechanical operations were performed on the mechanical teams and the mechanical preparation of a 
Mariner project, the scope of these operations will be spacecraft for flight. 
II. SCOPE OF MECHANICAL OPERATIONS 
Spacecraft mechanical operations are an integral but 
separable part of spacecraft system operations. The 
functions of system operations are (1) to qualify the space- 
craft for flight by a series of operational and environ- 
mental tests and (2) to prepare the spacecraft for flight. 
On the Mariner Mars 1964 project, the qualification 
function was performed at JPL in Pasadena and the 
process of flight preparation was performcd at the Air 
Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR). Mechanically, how- 
ever, the qualification and flight preparation processes 
are similar and, in some cases, duplications of one an- 
other. Therefore, they are discussed here as a single 
process, although certain portions of each occur more 
than once. 
A. Test Configurations 
The qualification of a spacecraft for flight is accom- 
plished through a thorough and rigorous test program 
which requires a wicle variety of spacecraft mechanical 
confignrntions. Figiires 1 through 10 illiistrate the major 
tests and the mechanical configuration for each test, as 
well as the inflight boost and cruise configurations, 
It may be interesting to note that only the vibr a t' ion 
test, matchmate test (mating with the second stage of the 
launch vehicle), free-mode test, and weight and center- 
of-mass clctcrmination require that the spacecraft me- 
chanically resemlile the two flight configurations.' These 
tests, as well as the Inunch from the AFETH, require that 
the spacecraft assume a configuration for transportation 
or shipping, as shown in Fig. 10. 
Fig. 1. Flight spacecraft boost configuration 
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Fig. 2. Flight spacecraft cruise configuration 
*- 
Fig. 3. System iesi 
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Fig. 4. Vibration test 
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Fig. 7. Magnetometer mapping 
Fig. 8. Free mode test 
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Fig. 10. Flight spacecraft prepared for shipping 
The illustrations indicate that many mechanical opera- 
tions are performed on a flight spacecraft from the time 
individual pieces of equipment are delivered to the 
Spacecraft Assembly Facility (SAF) until the vehicle is 
launched. The responsibility for the performance of these 
operations is assigned to a mechanical test and opera- 
tions team. The team's primary functions are (1) to me- 
chanically prepare the spacecraft for qualification tests 
within the specified schedule and (2) to ensure that the 
spacecraft, as launched, is mechanically equivalent to 
what it was when qualified. 
In carrying out this responsibility, the test team is 
subject to schedule pressure. The Mariner IV spacecraft, 
which may be considered typical of unmanned, inter- 
planetary systems, was permitted approximately seven 
months froin iuitial flight equipincnt deli\,eries until it 
was to be ready for launch. Of this time, five months 
were allowecl for TPL Pasadena operations i-u qL"ifp t h e  
spacecraft for flight. and two months for the Ak'BlH 
operations. The Mariner IV original test and operations 
schedule allowed 30 to 40v of this total time for me- 
chanical operations. This amount of time would appear 
to be adequate. However, since some equipment can lie 
delivered late, initial assembly can be inefficient on a 
time basis and can occur only as the equipment becomes 
available. Also, as testing proceeds and problems are 
discovered, electronic troubleshooting teams use time 
normally allotted for the mechanical operations. Although 
margins are placed in the test schedule for troubleshoot- 
ing, this time is not always adequate, particularly when 
troubleshooting requires extensive mechanical opera- 
tions-such as during thermal-vacuum testing, when a 
complicated test setup (Fig. 5)  must be disassembled to 
permit spacecraft mechanical operations and electrical 
troubleshooting. Since the time for mechanical opera- 
tions and the launch schedule remain constant, many 
mechanical opcrations must be performed at odd hours 
222 often 011 -1 miiltiple shift basis. This is a fatiguing 
moae or upel aiioii h i  incrc:ses humnn ~11swptibility . P  
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to error. As the schedule proceeds, the allowable margin 
for mechanical error decreases. These demanding condi- 
tions impose special requirements on the organization 
and staffing of the mechanical test team. 
B. Mechanical Test and Operations Team 
011 the A4ariner Mars 1964 project, the mechanical test 
and operations team for each flight spacecraft consisted 
of the following permanent members: 
1. A systems mechanical engineer (a mechanical engi- 
neer from the JPL Project Engineering Division) 
2. A spacecraft cognizant mechanical engineer (a me- 
chanical engineer from the JPL Engineering Me- 
chanics Division) 
3. A lead mechanical technician 
4. A mechanical inspector 
Additional technical support was provided, as required, 
from a pool of Mariner spacecraft mechanical technicians. 
Most mechanical operations needed two or three person- 
nel from this pool; each technician worked under the 
direction of the lead mechanic. 
The functional organization for individual spacecraft 
mechanical test and operations teams is shown in Fig. 11. 
The two cognizant mechanical engineers shared responsi- 
bilities so operations could be performed when either 
engineer was present. The systems mechanical engineer 
was responsible for interface operations with test facili- 
ties and the launch vehicle, as well as for the overall 
spacecraft. The spacecraft cognizant mechanical engi- 
neer, possessing a greater familiarity with the mechanical 
design and details of the spacecraft, directed assembly 
operations during initial buildup. This arrangement 
worked very well, since each engineer learned the other’s 
duties, and either one could accept total responsibility. 
This arrangement was particularly effective when mul- 
tiple shift operations were required. 
The mechanical technician leadman, a senior tech- 
nician with broad experience in aerospace mechanical 
REPORTS TO THE TEST AND OPERATIONS MANAGER 
THROUGH THE SPACECRAFT TEST DIRECTOR 
t 
SYSTEMS MECHANICAL 
ENGINEER - I 
SPACECRAFT COGNIZANT 
MECHANICAL ENGINEER 
MECHANICAL TECHNICIAN 
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I  
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SPACECRAFT LEAD 
I I 
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Fig, 11. Spacecraft mechanical test and 
operations team 
technology, was responsible for the overall performance 
and administrative supervision of the mechanics of all 
the spacecraft. It was his duty to assign individual tech- 
nicians to support operations on any of the two flight 
and one spare spacecraft, and to direct mechanical work 
in support of functions related to the spacecraft. 
The spacecraft lead mechanic, a senior technician 
possessing technical supervisory qualities as well as me- 
chanical skills, was responsible for the detailed direction 
of assigned mechanics from the technician pool. He was 
a permanent member of a particular spacecraft team, 
and was under the technical direction of the mechanical 
engineers responsible for the spacecraft. 
A pool of skilled mechanical technicians was used to 
handle the varying workload of a prototype and three 
flight spacecraft. Assignments were made and shifted in 
accordance with each spacecraft’s operations schedule. 
This approach served two purposes: (1) efficient use of 
personnel by minimizing deadtime, and (2) maintenance 
of technician proficiency by providing nearly continuous 
experience in all spacecraft assembly tasks. 
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111. DISCUSSION 
Spacecraft mechanical assembly is by definition an 
interface operation. Therefore, two types of mechanical 
problems can be expected (1) inadequacy of installation 
hardware, and (2) mismatch of mating parts. In a tightly 
scheduled project, these interface problems are more 
likely to occur because of inadequate investigation of 
seemingly minor design details. 
A. Assembly 
In the assembly of the Mariner flight spacecraft, many 
problems arose with installation hardware (mechanical 
fasteners, cable clamps, washers, etc.). Specified screws 
were too long, too short, or unavailable. Screws with 
locking devices and other hardware were not designated 
when they should have been, or were unavailable when 
they were specified. Many of these problems were dis- 
covered on the proof test model (PTM), but due to the 
tight schedule, they were not corrected in time for oper- 
ations on the flight spacecraft. These types of problems 
retard spacecraft assembly operations, since each one 
requires several actions to solve it: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The problem must be properly identified 
An acceptable solution must be found and ap- 
proved so that operations may proceed 
The documentation must be corrected and ap- 
proved 
New hardware may have to be ordered to cover 
the requirements 
A procedure must be established for ensuring that 
the proper hardware is installed when it becomes 
available 
Mariner operations were expedited by giving one man 
the sole responsibility of making sure that these tasks 
were accomplished. 
Solution of installation hardware problems on the 
Mariner project was expedited through the use of a 
flexible engineering change order system. This system 
enables the spacecraft cognizant engineer to initiate 
drawing changes whenever installation problems are 
encountered. Rapid approval and release of these 
changes provide current documentation in the assembly 
areas upon which assembly personnel can rely. 
OF OPERATIONS 
The other problem that occurred during initial me- 
chanical assembly-mismatch of mating parts-is com- 
mon to any type of assembly operation. It is probably 
a truism that most things do not fit right the first time. 
Mechanical fitting problems may occur for any number 
of reasons, but they require similar actions to solve them 
as do those problems of installation hardware. Since 
mechanical fitting problems can occur with any subsys- 
tem, it is difficult for one man to be assigned to resolve 
them. On the Mariner Mars 1964 project, mechanical 
fitting problems were handled through the identification 
of each problem by the cognizant spacecraft mechanical 
engineer arid Iesolution of it through the subsystem 
cognizant engineer. Since these interface problems were 
the most pressing ones, additional follow-up was usually 
required by cognizant spacecraft engineers to ensure that 
they were solved within the time schedule. 
0. Flight Preparation 
The major mechanical problem associated with pre- 
flight operations was assurance that the spacecraft had 
been properly assembled. All items must be correctly 
installed and secured and all nonflight items removed. 
On Mariner Mars 1964 the latter was guaranteed through 
the use of a tote board. This board held a pocket for 
every nonflight item that was attached to the spacecraft 
(protective devices, dummy pinpullers, safe/arm pins, 
etc.). Every pocket on the board had to contain the 
proper device before the spacecraft was permitted to be 
encapsulated for flight. 
Assurance that the spacecraft is properly assembled is 
more difficult to achieve. In contrast with electrical con- 
nections, end-to-end checks cannot be made. Reliance 
must be placed on the integrity and thoroughness of the 
technical personnel and on the signed-off procedures 
and inspection reports. This final assembly checkout is 
probably the single most disquieting facet of preflight 
mechanical operations. There is no single device that 
testifies, unequivocally, to the fact that the spacecraft 
has been properly prepared for flight. 
C. People and Procedures 
Ultimately, people and not procedures must be relied 
on for confidence in the flight worthiness of a spacecraft. 
Mariner experience indicates that it is extremely difficult 
to evolve good mechanical assembly procedures during a 
ii 
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spacecraft development program. The establishment of 
useful procedures depends on inputs from the people 
actually doing the work. On a tight schedule, the proce- 
dure exists, but is dynamic. Corrections are necessary but 
exist only in the minds of the engineers and technicians 
and are committed to paper only when time is available. 
Sometimes corrected revisions are issued long after the 
time they are needed. When a corrected procedure be- 
comes available it may be difficult to persuade assembly 
personnel to use it. They have probably done the same 
operation many times without it and feel they can con- 
tinue doing the job correctly without a procedure. Also, 
if procedures contain errors or inaccuracies, and a 
method does not exist for making rapid corrections, the 
procedures will be ignored. Therefore, for a system to 
effectively use formal procedures, a quick-change tech- 
nique is required that is similar to that mentioned above 
for engineering drawings. Similarly, the responsibility for 
maintaining current procedures should be assigned to a 
specific individual. 
The nature of spacecraft mechanical operations com- 
plicates the use of procedures. Since spacecraft assume 
many different configurations (Fig. I through 10) the 
proper procedure for performing a given operation in 
one configuration may not be correct in another. There- 
fore, it is difficult to generate procedures that are ex- 
plicit and accurate, yet general enough to cover all 
configurntions. For Mariner Mars 1964, the general pro- 
cedure method was used, and the applicable parts ex- 
tracted to cover particular oper. ‘1t’ ions. 
Because of the strong reliance on people for the proper 
performance of spacecraft mechanical operations, their 
careful selection is very important. 
The cognizant mechanical engineers set the tone of 
the working environment. Along with technical compe- 
tence, they must possess a thorough understanding of 
the mechanica! aspccts of the spacecraft, be precise iii 
their execution of mechanical operations, be aware 
of possible problem areas, and be persistent in pursuing 
problems to a satisfactory solution. Conversely, partici- 
pation in spacecraft mechanical system operations pro- 
vides excellent training for engineers responsible for 
spacecraft mechanical design. Knowledge gained through 
this experience permits feedback to the design of future 
spacecraft so that mechanical operations can be more 
simply and therefore more reliably performed. 
In addition to possessing suitable mechanical skills, 
the prime requisite of mechanical technicians is that they 
always exercise care. After a technician has performed 
the spacecraft assembly operations several times, he has 
learned most of what he needs to know to repeat these 
operations. From here on, the principal challenges to his 
ability are for speed, thoroughness and care. Spacecraft, 
by nature, are fragile, and carelessness, particularly late 
in the schedule, can be catastrophic. Finally, the tech- 
nicians should be compatible with all team members. 
Preparation of a spacecraft for flight requires close team- 
work for several months. Incompatibility can cause 
dissension that can be detrimental to performance. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The ultimate success of the hlariner ZV flight suggests 
that all aspects of the program were properly performed 
including the mechanical operations. This program pro- 
vided extensive experience that should be useful to 
future space projects. These conclusions and recom- 
mendations, in particular, should be valuable to all 
spacecraft mechanical teams. 
A. Personnel Competence and Experience 
The primary requirement of the mechanical team is to 
perform all its operations correctly and within schedule. 
The conflicting aspects of this requirement generate 
pressures that can create problems. This fact and the 
increasingly dire consequences of mechanical accidents 
late in the schedule emphasize the need for careful per- 
sonnel selection for mechanical teams. (1) It is impor- 
tant that a permanent member of the team with technical 
supervision responsibilities (a spacecraft cognizant me- 
chanical engineer) havc an intimate knowledge of the 
spacecraft’s mechanical details. Also, this “cradle-to- 
grave” philosophy provides for the continual upgrading 
in spacecraft mechanical design such that mechanical 
operations on future spacecraft are simple and safe. 
12 
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(2) Similarly, technician crews should be staffed by per- 
sonnel exerienced on spacecraft mock-ups, test models, 
etc. and who, therefore, are thoroughly familiar with the 
spacecraft before working on flight units. (3) Efficient 
personnel utilization and maintenance of technical pro- 
ficiency can be achieved through the use of a spacecraft 
technician pool. However, the suitability of this approach 
may be more strongly influenced by other factors, such 
as organization structure, personalities, schedules, etc. 
6. Response to Project Directives 
The mechanical team must be prepared to respond 
quickly to project directives that require changes in 
operation sequence and schedule. In a tiglilly 
program, the project manager must maintain flexibility 
in altering test sequences and schedules to satisfy the 
overall mission objectives. The mechanical team must 
recognize and handle these changes as they occur, as 
well as inform the project manager of the effects of these 
operations on the mechanical integrity of the spacecraft. 
For example, just as the Mariner IV spacecraft was being 
prepared for transportation to the environmental labora- 
tory for vibration testing, it was decided that an elec- 
tronic assembly should be replaced. This operation 
required extensive disassembly of the spacecraft. The 
mechanical team, after working long hours in the tedious 
operation of buttoning-up the spacecraft, had to repeat 
the operation on an accelerated basis in order to main- 
tain the schedule. 
C. Documentation 
A formal change method should be devised and per- 
sonnel assigned for its execution, to ensure the rapid and 
thorough initiation and follow-up of changes to assembly 
and installation drawings and procedures. 
D. Preflight Mechanical Verification 
There is no single test that verifies that the spacecraft 
is mechanically ready for flight. For this verification, 
reliance must be placed upon proper monitoring and 
control by the cognizant mechanical engineers, proper 
use of mechanical procedures by operating technicians, 
and monitoring and sign-off of documentation by qual- 
ity assurance personnel. 
E. Continuity of Effort 
The reliance upon personnel for the thorough and suc- 
cessful performance of spacecraft mechanical operations 
accents the need for continuity of effort during space- 
craft system operations. The mechanical team concept, 
with cogni/:aiiC i l d ~ a n i c a l  engineers and a lead me- 
chanic permanently assigned to each spacecraft, provides 
this continuity in mechanical operations. This approach 
provides each permanent team member with a sound, 
current appraisal of the spacecraft status as well as par- 
ticular spacecraft peculiarities. 
This report has been a generalized discussion of the 
salient aspects of spacecraft mechanical operations. 
The intent here has been to warn the reader of those 
features of spacecraft mechanical operations that are 
most important to their successful completion. Discus- 
sion of detailed implementation has been avoided not 
for lack of importance, but because these details are 
not generally applicable, being a function of the space- 
craft mechanical design. 
In spacecraft mechanical operations, as in all aspects 
of a space program, the detailed implementation of an 
overall philosophy is of major importance. Recognition 
of the general aspects presented here, followed by the 
thorough and competent detailed mechanization of 
the operations plan, are essential to the successful com- 
pletion of spacecraft mechanical operations. 
